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To say that high levels of investment and efficient investment allocation require a good
investment climate is a tautology. The policy question is to identify the precise condi-
tions that make up a good investment climate. The current policy consensus is that a
good investment climate is characterized by standard good governance requirements
together with the adequate supply of certain types of infrastructure, such as electricity
and telephone lines. Good governance in turn is measured by the stability of property
rights and, according to some, the depth of democracy and public accountability. The
theory is that stable property rights (measured by a number of factors, including a low
risk of expropriation and a low level of corruption) induce high investment rates and
ensure efficiency in investment allocation, while democracy signals that governments
will not engage in ex post expropriation. These conditions, it is argued, are essential
for ensuring rapid growth and sustained poverty reduction. These key policy goals,
identified in the new consensus on investment climate, are best attained by policies that
promote a service delivery state (Khan 2002). This is a state that protects property
rights, is subject to the rule of law, does not intervene in markets, and provides key
services, such as electricity and telephone lines.
The desirability of many of these institutional goals, particularly anticorruption and
democracy, can hardly be questioned as ends in themselves. Nevertheless, several ques-
tions need to be addressed. First, does the evidence validate the claims that these are
necessary, let alone sufficient, preconditions for growth? Second, has the theory behind
the policy agenda been rigorous in identifying the critical preconditions of growth that
need to be implemented in developing countries to accelerate their growth rates? And
third—and most important—are there more important and vital institutional precon-
ditions for high and sustained investment regimes in developing countries? If there are,
we may be missing them by focusing on reforms that sound plausible and are clearly
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desirable themselves but that may not be targeting the most critical obstacles to
growth.
On the question of evidence, a substantial body of literature appears to show a cor-
relation between standard good governance characteristics on the one hand and invest-
ment and growth performance in developing countries on the other (see Hall and Jones
1999; Kauffman, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobatón 1999; Johnson, Kaufman and Zoido-
Lobatón 1998; Clague and others 1997; World Bank 1997; Knack and Keefer 1995,
1997; Barro 1996; and Mauro 1995). But this evidence has to be treated carefully, for
a variety of reasons (Khan 2002).
• The indices measuring governance quality are subjective. Respondents in well-
performing countries are likely to give high rankings simply because things are
working well. For instance, China scores higher than India on indices of the rule of
law. But can we be sure that the higher ranking really reflects the better implemen-
tation of the rule of law in China? Or might the ranking simply reflect that the
Chinese “legal system” works better to provide the things that investors want—and
may be overriding the legal rights of other groups?
• Available time series data are inadequate to test causality. Most indices of gover-
nance quality begin in the mid-1980s; the more reliable data are available only for
the 1990s. Longer time series are needed to determine if high-growth countries
implemented good governance reforms or created good investment climates before
their growth took off. 
• The number of high-growth countries is too small to generate satisfactory econo-
metric results. The high-growth developers are particularly important, because even
though governance indices are not available for periods before their takeoffs, their
governance indices remained poor for a considerable period even after growth took
off. Even in the mid-1980s the Asian high-growth economies come out only a little
better than many poorly performing countries in terms of the Knack and Keefer
(1995) indices of institutional quality (based on quality of bureaucracy, rule of law,
expropriation risk and contract repudiation by government). Rodrik (1997) notes
that while growth within East Asian countries was correlated with the index, only
Japan, Singapore, and Taiwan (China) had high scores, and none was remotely poor
by the mid-1980s. Indonesia scored the same as Ghana, Myanmar, and the Repub-
lic of Congo, while Malaysia, the Republic of Korea, and Thailand were at the same
level as Côte d’Ivoire. Nor were most high-growth developers democratic when
they began growing. Thus while poorly performing developing countries did not
have good governance characteristics, neither did many of the high-growth devel-
oping countries, well into their growth phases. If there were many of these high-
growth countries in the regression exercises, the results may have changed; as it is,
they simply drop out as outliers. But they should not be treated as outliers: they are
the only cases of successful transitions in recent history.
• Most worrisome for the consensus, there are no historical examples of countries
that first improved governance as defined in good governance theory and then
began growing rapidly. Cross-sectional and even time series regression exercises
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are misleading, because they do not allow sequential analysis of individual coun-
tries to be conducted to see which came first, better governance in the conventional
sense or high growth driven by institutional changes that had little to do with good
governance. No one would argue that Taiwan (China) in the 1950s, the Republic
of Korea in the late 1950s and early 1960s, or China in the 1970s were introducing
good governance, as it is defined today, and that their success in having done so
explains their subsequent high rates of growth.
These issues are summarized in figure 1, which plots Knack and Keefer’s Property
Right Stability Index (incorporating corruption, rule of law, bureaucratic quality,
government contract repudiation, and expropriation risk) for 1984, the earliest avail-
able year, against GDP growth rates for 1980–90. While the regression line has the
expected positive slope (although the R2 is only 0.03), the countries separate into three
distinct groups. Most countries belong to either group 1 (low-growth developing
countries, defined by a growth rate below the advanced country average) or group 3
(advanced industrial countries, defined by their per capita incomes). Group 1 has
low growth (by definition) and poor governance characteristics, while group 3 has
higher growth and the best governance characteristics. The most interesting group is
group 2 (developing countries that are catching up by virtue of having higher growth
rates than the advanced countries). Although the countries in this group are not
Source: Author’s calculations.
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numerous enough to affect the slope of the regression line, they are the only ones actu-
ally catching up. While their growth was significant, their property rights and other
governance characteristics were not significantly different from the developing coun-
try average. This observation is particularly significant given that the data are already
biased in some of the ways mentioned earlier (high-growth countries are likely to gen-
erate better subjective indices of governance). Moreover, because they have already
grown for some time, their governance characteristics would be expected to be better
as a result of growth.
This evidence raises a very important question for catching-up policies in develop-
ing countries: do group 1 countries try to reach group 3 by first emulating the gover-
nance characteristics of group 3 countries, or do they look at history and try to attain
the governance characteristics of group 2 countries, the only countries actually catch-
ing up? The route to group 3 may be through group 2, in which case, the relevant
institutional and governance capacities for group 1 countries should be sought in
group 2 rather than group 3 (Khan 2002). Whatever the critical institutional and
governance characteristics that created a good investment climate in group 2 coun-
tries, they did not include stable property rights and other characteristics that good
governance theory identifies.
These empirical observations raise serious questions about the adequacy of the
theory underlying the current consensus on what constitutes a good investment
climate. Underlying the good governance and investment climate approaches is a
theory of capitalist development that has many weaknesses. These theories are based
on observations of capitalist economies in industrial countries, but the theoretical
mechanisms they assert may not be appropriate for identifying reform priorities in
emerging capitalist economies going through developmental transitions. In particu-
lar, the focus on stable property rights and the creation of a well-functioning market
needs to be questioned. While these are important characteristics of an advanced
capitalist economy, creating a capitalist economy always requires substantial restruc-
turing of property rights and incentives for emerging capitalists to rapidly acquire
new technologies. During this transition, the condition of stable property rights is an
odd one to aim for, particularly since the existing structure of rights and production
systems is by definition of low productivity. The real question is whether the eco-
nomic and social restructuring taking place is taking the country in the direction of
a viable capitalist economy or not. The danger is that the good governance and
investment climate approaches are bypassing the difficult questions about social
transformation, instead focusing on reforms that may make an already existing
capitalist market economy work better.
Recent historical experience suggests that developing countries that successfully
transformed themselves into growth economies shared a number of important char-
acteristics that were quite different from those identified in the investment climate
and good governance approaches. These characteristics enabled their states to play a
critical role in ensuring rapid structural changes (see Khan 2002). Two of the most
important were the capacity to alter property rights and the capacity to manage
growth-enhancing rents and destroy growth-reducing rents.
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Far from guaranteeing not to intervene in property rights, dynamic transformation
states actively engaged in property right transformations that transformed poorly
performing precapitalist property rights into rights that were more appropriate for
rapid productivity growth. These changes in the structure of rights were organized
only partly through markets. Many important changes involved nonmarket transfers
and interventions. These ranged from direct interventions in property rights (such as
land reform) to indirect interventions that tilted the playing field to make it easier for
some groups to acquire new rights (involving policies affecting relative prices, taxes,
exchange rates, and land regulations) and even included state involvement in illegal
transfers of rights (land grabs by individuals or groups connected to political power).
It is not possible to generalize about the role of any of these processes in the capital-
ist transformation, since the type of intervention and its effect varied dramatically
across countries, depending on initial technological and institutional conditions and
internal political power structures. In most developing countries these processes led
to plunder by unproductive classes, and growth and development suffered. In the few
countries that did succeed, these processes led to the emergence of a dynamic capi-
talist class. All that can be said with some certainty is that capitalism did not emerge
where states lacked the institutional and political capacity to carry out far-reaching
changes in rights and or where states simply protected the sanctity of precapitalist
property right structures.
Dynamic states also intervened in markets to create and manage rents to acceler-
ate technology acquisition and to promote the competitiveness of emerging domestic
capitalists. This, too, is very different from the good governance claim that competi-
tive markets require that states should not intervene. There is a big difference between
creating and maintaining international competitiveness and withdrawing all rents
from the market and eliminating the capacity of the state to create any rents. Indus-
trial countries maintain significant rents in their markets to promote technological
innovation and stabilize their polities. In just the same way, developing countries have
to acquire the capacity to create and manage rents to accelerate the adoption of new
technologies and manage their polities. Dynamic transformation states had these
capacities; less dynamic states often did not. Once again, the good governance and
investment climate approaches divert attention from how to create these critical rent-
management capacities in developing countries.
The types of changes in rights and the required rent-management capacities can—
and do—differ significantly across countries. The task of policy-relevant research is to
identify the conditions that determine which types of capacities and structural changes
are most relevant in specific contexts (Khan 2000a, 2000b).
While this work needs to be extended, it is also important to point out that the
current focus on good governance and investment climate reforms has serious weak-
nesses, because it does not address very important issues that historical observation
suggest were critical in successful transformations. If nothing more, this should warn
us against making exaggerated claims for the new policies.
We should be aware of at least two types of dangers. The first is that a focus on a
policy that does not identify the critical state capacities essential for ensuring high
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investment rates and efficient investment allocation may waste resources and divert
policy attention from critical tasks that may be neglected. The political fallout is
likely to be very damaging if developing countries following the advice of multilater-
al agencies are once again disappointed by the results. But an even more serious
possibility is that a focus on a particular version of good governance and investment
climate reforms could even weaken state capacities to carry out effective transforma-
tion interventions. This is not just a theoretical possibility: the service delivery con-
ception of the state underlying the good governance and investment climate models
argues that the state should restrict itself to a very limited number of service delivery
tasks. If the state is trimmed down to a few key service delivery agencies and made
to protect existing property rights to the best of its ability, the possibility of creating
an effective transformation state in the future may be significantly reduced. If mak-
ing a real difference in the investment climate requires creating a viable capitalist
economy, investment climate reforms that reduce the state to service delivery tasks
may paradoxically make it more difficult to achieve the investment climate that is
desired.
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